The Interaction of Animacy, Definiteness, and Specificity in Spanish

Klaus von Heusinger & Georg A. Kaiser

vonHeusinger@ilg.uni-stuttgart.de
georg.kaiser@uni-konstanz.de

1. Introduction*

Referential categories, such as animacy, definiteness, and specificity, determine or restrict the way we refer to objects, i.e. they are semantic (and pragmatic) by nature, but they are also reflected in numerous morphosyntactic phenomena. However, the mapping between such a category and certain morphosyntactic phenomena is very difficult to draw for at least three reasons: First, the referential categories are often only described in informal terms, second, the morphosyntactic phenomena are seldom described in sufficient detail, and third there are only few investigations into the interaction between these categories.

An informal description of the following data illustrates this point. In Standard Spanish, the particle *a* generally marks a [+animate] [+specific] direct object, as in (1a). If the direct object is [–animate], the particle in ungrammatical, as in (1b). Thus the referential parameters [+animate] and [+specific] determine the choice of *a*, while definiteness does not play a role.

(1a)   [+animate], [±definite], [+specific]:

        Vi   *(*a*) **la / una mujer**.   (Standard Spanish)
        see.past-1.sg   the a   woman
        'I saw the / a woman.'

(1b)   [–animate], [±definite], [+specific]:

        Vi   (*a) **la / una mesa**.   (Standard Spanish)
        see.past-1.sg   the a   table
        'I saw the / a table.'

However, in several dialectal variants of Spanish, especially in those from Latin America, the particle *a* can also precede a [–animate] direct object if it is [+definite] and [+specific], as in (2) (Kany, 1951:2):

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(2)   [–animate], [+definite], [+specific]:
(2a)   Vio   *a* **las sierras**.   (Puerto Rican Spanish)
          saw.past-3.sg   the mountains
          '(S)he saw the mountains'
(2b)   Cosecharon   *a***l maíz**.   (Argentinian Spanish)
          harvest.past-3.pl   the corn
          'They harvested the corn'

In Standard Spanish both sentences in (2) are ungrammatical since they violate the restriction that the particle *a* can only occur with a [+animate] direct object, cf. (1b). In American Spanish dialects, on the other hand, the particle can appear if the direct object is [+definite] and [+specific]. Definiteness is not a determining parameter for *a* in Standard Spanish, while animacy seems not to be a determining parameter for Spanish dialects allowing *a* with [–animate] objects. Specificity is an obligatory parameter in both variants, as summarized in table (3):

(3)   Parameters for determining the use of *a* with direct objects

| Variant / category	animacy	definiteness	specificity
Standard Spanish	[+animate]	( )	[+specific]
American Spanish	( )	[+definite]	[+specific]

This very informal description must be developed in at least three directions: First, we have to give a clear definition, or at least a much better description, of our referential categories, in particular that of specificity. Second, we need more relevant data and a much deeper analysis of it in terms of the discussed referential categories. For example, we have to ask whether or not the use of *a* with [+definite] and [+specific] is only an exception or an acceptable variant. Third, we have to describe the interaction of the different categories: Is the interaction between animacy and definiteness similar or equal to that between specificity and definiteness? In this paper we intend to give first answers to these questions through an in depth analysis of the three referential categories involved, looking at the morphosyntactic reflexes of mood in relevative clauses, the use of *a* with direct objects, and clitic doubling in Spanish.

    In section 2, we present the three referential categories animacy, definiteness, and specificity, and discuss their particular values, and their representations as scales, hierarchies or polar features. In section 3, we account for three morphosyntactic phenomena in Spanish in terms of these referential categories: (i) mood selection in relative clauses; (ii) the conditions for the use of *a* with direct objects ("prepositional accusative"); and (iii) the restriction of clitic doubling in Standard and Río de La Plata Spanish, a variety of Spanish spoken in the area of Buenos Aires. It will be shown that the particular behaviour of clitic doubling in this variety of Spanish cannot be explained in terms of harmonic alignment of definiteness and specificity. In section 4, we therefore discuss different theoretical models of combining referential categories, such as subordination, cross-classification, and harmonic alignment. In Section 5, we give a short summary of our findings and directions for further research.

2. Referential categories

We use "referential categories" or "referential parameters" as a cover term for linguistic categories (or concepts) that are related to the semantic nature of an expression and its way [to] of referring. The class contains categories such as animacy, gender, number, specificity (or referentiality), genericity, definiteness and probably many more . We do not intend to define such a class or to discuss the nature of all the elements. Rather, we focus on three categories, namely animacy, definiteness, and specificity. Even in a very simple model of reference, as in (4), these categories occupy very different locations. Animacy is a lexical property of an expression, definiteness is a discourse pragmatic property, and specificity is a referential category.[1]

(4)   A simple model of reference:

expression	→	discourse model / discourse referents	→	"world" / referents / objects
[±animate]		[±definite]		[±specific]

2.1 Animacy

Simplified, we define animacy as a lexical feature of linguistic expressions that describes a certain property of the intended referent.[2] Animacy is often represented by a scale of different values, as in (5).

(5)   Animacy Scale: human > animate > inanimate

As Silverstein (1976) and others have observed, animacy may determine certain morphosyntactic features in a language, such as grammatical hierarchies, number marking, or the lexical choice of question word. In English, German, French and Spanish, like in many other Indo-European languages, the choice of question word is determined by the animacy value for the noun phrase in the intended answer. The categorial cut is made between [+human] and [–human], as in (6):

(6)   Animacy Scale and choice of question word

human	animate > inanimate
[+human]	[–human]
who / whom	what / what

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[1] We do not want to take any position towards the question whether reference is a relation between the expression and its referent or whether it is a relation between a discourse representation and model theoretic objects, as in Discourse Representation Theory and as sketched in (4).

[2] One could also argue that it is a conceptual feature assigned to the referent by the speaker, which is reflected in the behavior of the linguistic expression associated with it. We do not want to discuss this subtle disctinction or the question whether there is a distinction between natural and grammatical animacy.

(6a)	**Who** have you seen?	**What** have you seen?
(6b)	**Wen** hast du gesehen?	**Was** hast du gesehen?
(6c)	**Qui** as-tu vu?	**Qu'**as-tu vu?
(6d)	¿**A quién** has visto?	¿**Qué** has visto?

The categorial cut between two values of the scale is not always easy to make. Additionally, people may differ in the conception of certain objects with respect to these values. For example, a pet with a name is often regarded as part of the family, and therefore included in the [+human] rather than the [–human] category. There are many more such grey areas between categories that are otherwise clearly defined.

2.2 Definiteness

In a pre-theoretical definition, a definite singular expression unambiguously denotes or refers to one object, i.e. the object can be identified as the only one that is denoted by the expression. The fixed reference of a definite expression depends on as different parameters as the type of expression, semantic rules, and pragmatic strategies. There are several theories of definiteness, each of which focuses on a particular aspect of definiteness, a certain class of definite expressions, or one prominent use of them: (i) Russell's Theory of Definite Description is based on unique definite NPs; (ii) the anaphoric or familiarity theory of definiteness (Karttunen, 1976; Kamp, 1981; Heim, 1982) assumes that the anaphoric potential of definite NPs is the most characteristic; (iii) Löbner's (1985) theory of definiteness starts from the functional use; and (iv) the theory of definiteness as salience is based on the situational use of definite NPs (Lewis, 1979; Egli & von Heusinger, 1995). Again, we cannot present the whole discussion on this issue, but for a more comprehensive overview see Heim (1991) and von Heusinger (1997).

Here, we assume with Karttunen (1976), Kamp (1981), Heim (1982) and the dynamic tradition, that definiteness is a discourse-pragmatic property that indicates that the discourse referent associated with a definite expression can be identified with an already introduced discourse item. Thus, definiteness does not express the identifiability of the referent (in the world), a widespread view in descriptive grammars. Rather, definiteness expresses familiarity in a discourse structure. The discourse structure is understood as an intermediate structure between the linguistic expressions and their referents in "the world", as simplified in (4) above.

Besides the simple contrast between definite and indefinite, we also find different versions of "Definiteness Scales" The following is proposed by Aissen (2000:2), who refers to Croft (1988):

(7)   Definiteness Scale (Aissen, 2000):
        personal pronoun > proper noun > definite NP > indefinite NP

For certain discourse pragmatic functions, like anaphoric linkage, the Scale is divided by a categorial cut into two parts: The [+definite] expressions and the [-definite] expressions. A definite expression is accessible for anaphora, even if it is in the scope of a negation (or other operators), as illustrated by the contrast between (9) and (10).

(8)   Anaphoric Accessibility and the Definiteness Scale:

personal pronoun > proper noun > definite NP [+definite]	indefinite NP [–definite]
accessible even under negation	not accessible under negation

(9)   Sam did not see a car. #It was a Porsche.
(10)   Sam did not see the car. It was a Porsche.

Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) of Kamp (1981) and Kamp & Reyle (1993) explains the different accessibility structures of the two small text fragments (9) and (10) by assuming that the definite NP *the car* in (10) introduces a discourse referent e in the main box. This discourse referent is accessible for the discourse referent g associated with the pronoun *it* (cf. (10a)). In (9a) the indefinite introduces a discourse referent e only in the embedded box such that the pronoun discourse referent cannot access it.

(9a)

$$\frac{d}{Sam(d)}$$
$$not \; \frac{e}{\frac{car(e)}{see(d,e)}}$$
$$g = ?$$
$$Porsche(g)$$

(10a)

$$\frac{d, e}{Sam(d)}$$
$$car(e)$$
$$not \; \frac{}{see(d,e)}$$
$$g = e$$
$$Porsche(g)$$

To sum up, we assume that definiteness describes the discourse-pragmatic property of familiarity: definite expressions indicate that their associated discourse items can be identified with already introduced ones, while indefinite expressions indicate that their discourse referents are new.

2.3 Specificity

The concept of specificity was introduced in the late 60s by transferring the *de re-de dicto* distinction of definite NPs to indefinite NPs. The contrast is illustrated by example (11), which can be assigned two readings: the specific reading of *a monk* is motivated by the continuation (11a), while the non-specific reading can be continued with (11b) (see von Heusinger, 2002):

(11)   Umberto Eco: "I desired to poison *a monk*."
(11a)   He lived in the famous monastery Bobbio in the year 1347.
(11b)   Therefore, Eco started to write a novel about a monastery.

 Unlike animacy and definiteness, specificity is not assigned a scale, but rather a categorial distinction between [+specific] and [–specific], as in (12). Alternatively, one could also assume a two-part scale, as in (12'). However, it is not clear why [+specific] outrank [–specific].

(12)   Specificity Contrast   [+specific] vs. [–specific]
(12')   Specificity Scale   [+specific] > [-specific]

The literature on specificity is mainly concerned with specific indefinite NPs, which are grouped into different classes: (i) scopal specific indefinites, (ii) epistemic specific indefinites, (iii) partitive specific indefinites, (iv) intermediate specific indefinites or "relative specific indefinites" (see Farkas, 1995 for the first three classes and von Heusinger, 2002 for the last class).

2.3.1 Scopal specificity

Classically, the contrast between a specific and a non-specific reading of an indefinite is configurationally represented by scope interaction between the indefinite and some other operator, such as verbs of propositional attitude, negation or universal quantifiers as in (11) above and (13)-(14) below. In (14), the indefinite interacts with two operators such that we expect three readings, which the readers can easily work out by themselves.

(13)   Bill didn't see **a misprint**.   (Karttunen 1976)
(13a)   There is a misprint which Bill didn't see.
(13b)   Bill saw no misprints.
(14)   Bill intends to visit **a museum** every day.   (Karttunen 1976)

2.3.2 Epistemic specificity

There are examples that show the same (intuitive) contrast, but do not contain operators. For the specific reading of (15), we can continue with (15a), while the non-specific reading can be continued by (15b). This contrast is also often described as *referential* vs. *non-referential*. The specific indefinite refers to its referent directly, while the non-specific indefinite depends on the interpretation of other expressions in the context.

(15)   **A student** in Syntax 1 cheated on the exam.   (Fodor & Sag 1982)
(15a)   His name is John.
(15b)   We are all trying to figure out who it was.

2.3.3 Partitive specificity

Milsark (1974) argues that indefinite NPs can either receive a weak (or existential) interpretation or a strong (or prepositional) interpretation. In (16) the indefinite *some ghosts* receives a weak interpretation, but it gets a strong interpretation in (17), i.e. it presupposes that there are other groups of ghosts. The reading in (17) is generally called "partitive".

(16)   There are **some ghosts** in this house.
(17)   **Some ghosts** live in the pantry; others live in the kitchen.

Enç (1991) claims, based on data from Turkish, that partitives denote an unknown element of a given set. Partitives always exhibit wide scope since the set from which they pick some elements

out is already mentioned. This means that partitives are complex expressions, formed by a choice from a definite set. We assume (contrary to Enç and others) that partitives comprise two independent referential functions: the first function ("the choice") can either be specific or non-specific, while the second function ("given set") must be definite. We therefore do not include them in the investigation of specific indefinites proper.

2.3.4 Relative specificity

The term "relative specific" or "intermediate specific indefinites" describes specific indefinites that depend on other expressions, and therefore show flexible scope behaviour. This observation was already made in early investigations of specificity. Contrary to Fodor & Sag (1982), Farkas (1981) shows with examples like (18) that indefinite NPs can have more than only a narrow scope non-specific reading (18a) and a wide scope specific reading (18c). They can also receive an "intermediate" scope reading (18b). According to this reading of (18), the indefinite *some condition proposed by Chomsky* has wide scope with respect to *three arguments* and narrow scope with respect to *each student*.

(18)   Each student has to come up with three arguments that show that **some condition proposed by Chomsky** is wrong. (Farkas, 1981)
(18a)   each student > three argument > **some condition**   narrow scope
(18b)   each student > **some condition** > three argument   intermediate scope
(18c)   **some condition** >each student > three argument   wide scope

Hintikka (1986) made a similar observation in his discussion of the expression *a certain*. In (19), he shows that the specific indefinite *a certain woman* can receive narrow scope with respect to the universal quantifier and still be specific: there is a specific woman for each man. Hintikka suggests that the specific indefinite NP is to be represented by a Skolem-function that assigns to each man the woman who is his mother. Once the reference for *man* is fixed (during the process of interpreting the universal quantifier), the reference for the specific indefinite is simultaneously fixed. In (19b), we informally mark this by indexing the indefinite NP with its anchor, here the variable for *man*.

(19)   According to Freud, every man unconsciously wants to marry **a certain woman** – his mother. (Hintikka, 1986)
(19a)   x [Man(x)   Wants(x, marry(x, f(x))]
         with f: Skolem function from men onto their mothers
(19b)   x [Man(x)   Wants(x, marry(x, [a woman]$_x$)]

These observations motivate a revision of the pre-theoretical description of specificity in terms of obligatory wide scope or referential expression. It is shown that a specific indefinite NP need not depend on the speaker or the context of utterance; it can also depend on other linguistic entities, like the universal quantifier *each student* in (18b) or *every man* in (19).

2.3.5 A unified theory of specificity

Just like different aspects of definiteness have lead to different theories of definiteness, the different aspects of specificity have invoked different theories of specificity. It is even controversial whether the different aspects belong to one and the same category or to different ones, or whether the different types of specificity are linked to each other by "family resemblance". We assume here that there is one underlying category of specificity. Our view is that the specific expression is linked or anchored to another expression (the anchor), and therefore its interpretation is independent of the direct linguistic context. The interpretation depends instead on the interpretation of the anchor expression. For a detailed account of this view, see von Heusinger (2002).

3 Morphosyntactic reflexes of referential categories

(Indo-European) languages strongly differ with respect to the morphosyntactic expression of referential categories. In some languages definiteness is marked using articles, while specificity is indicated by more subtle morphosyntactic contrasts. Often, the referential behaviour can only be recovered by discourse-pragmatic strategies. Spanish, however, seems to be a good candidate for a language where the three referential categories, animacy, definiteness, and specificity have numerous morphosyntactic reflexes. In this section we only discuss (i) mood selection in relative clauses, (ii) the "prepositional accussative" with the particle *a*, and (iii) clitic doubling in Standard Spanish and Río de La Plata Spanish.

3.1 Mood in relative clauses

A well-known and often cited case where one of the referential categories discussed in this article, namely specificity, is expressed by morphosyntactic means in Spanish, are the relative clauses. In this kind of clauses, the mood form of the finite verb may change with respect to the specificity of the head of the relative clause. As illustrated in (20), the verb appears in the indicative form with a [+specific] relativized noun, while subjunctive is used when the noun receives a [–specific] interpretation (Rivero, 1975; Leonetti, 1999: 865; Pérez Saldanya, 1999: 3256):

(20a)   [–animate], [–definite], [+*specific*]:
         Busco   **un libro** en el   que se   anali**za**   el modo en las
         search-1.sg a   book in   which that REF analyse-INDthe mood in the
         oraciones de relativo.
         clauses   of relative

(20b)   [–animate], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
        Busco   **un libro** en el   que se   analic*e*   el modo en las
        search-1.sg a   book in which that REF analyse-SUB the mood in the
        oraciones de relativo.
        relative clauses
        'I am looking for a book in which the mood in relative clauses is analyzed'

This morphological mood distinction in Spanish is linked to the specificity contrast (12) in section 2.3. In (20a), the indicative forces a reading according to which there exists a book in the world representing the characteristics established in the relative clause. The subjunctive in (20b), on the other hand, does not imply the existence of such a book, and the head noun does not refer to any particular book, but expresses the property of being a book. The existence of such a book is not implied since it is embedded under *search*.[3] This *de re-de dicto* distinction may be represented by a simple scope interaction between the indefinite and *search,* where (20a) corresponds to (21a) and (20b) to (21b) (Pérez Saldanya, 1999: 3259):

(21a)   [a book: x [x analyzes the mood in relative clauses & search x]]
(21b)   [search [a book: x & x analyzes the mood in relative clauses]]

Interestingly, this morphosyntactic contrast between a [+specific] and a [–specific] relativized noun is not restricted to *in*definite nouns, but can also be observed with [+definite] nouns (Leonetti, 1999: 865):

(22a)   [–animate], [+definite], [+*specific*]:
        Busco   **el libro** en el   que se   analiz*a*   el modo en las
        search-1.sg the book in which that REF analyse-IND the mood in the
        oraciones de relativo.
        clauses   of relative
(22b)   [–animate], [+definite], [–*specific*]:
        Busco   **el libro** en el   que se   analic*e*   el modo en las
        search-1.sg the book in which that REF analyse-SUB the mood in the
        oraciones de relativo.
        clauses   of relative
        'I am looking for a book in which the mood in relative clauses is analyzed'

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[3] Note that "existence" does not mean that a noun must exist in the real world. As noted by Pérez Saldanya (1999: 3256), the specificity contrast can also be observed with NPs referring to a fictious world:
(ia)   He   soñado que quería   visitar **una ciudad de Marte** que *estaba*
        have-1.sg dreamt that would-1.sg visit a   town of Mars   that was-IND
        habitada por alienígenas.
        inhabited by aliens.
(ib)   He   soñado que quería   visitar **una ciudad de Marte** que *estuviese*
        have-1.sg dreamt that would-1.sg visit a   town of Mars   that was-SUB
        habitada por alienígenas.
        inhabited by aliens.

However, according to Pérez Saldanya (1999: 3265), sentences like (22b) with [+definite, –specific] NPs are odd for some speakers. This seems to be due to the fact that [+definite] nouns in general presuppose a unique referent. Receiving a [–specific] interpretation, a [+definite] NP looses this existential presupposition and, therefore, does no longer refer to an object which is identifiable for the hearer, although it preserves its property to refer to an object in a unique way (Leonetti, 1980: 154). Given this 'uniqueness condition', the use of the subjunctive mood in relative clauses of *definite* nouns, indicating a non-specific head noun, is odd for some speakers. This oddness disappears when the sentence contains an element which allows us to deduce more easily the uniqueness of the [+definite] noun (cf. Leonetti, 1999: 865; Pérez Saldanya, 1999: 3265f):

(23)   [–animate], [+definite], [–*specific*]:
          Busco   **el libro** en el   que se   analic*e*   ***mejor*** el modo
          search-1.sg the book in which that REF analyse-SUB better   the mood
          en las oraciones de relativo.
          in the clauses   of relative
          'I am looking for a book in which the mood in relative clauses is better analyzed.'

These examples show clearly that the indicative – subjunctive distinction strongly correlates with the specificity of the relativized noun. In other words, specificity plays a crucial role for the use of mood in relative clauses.[4]

3.2 The "prepositional" accusative

Standard Spanish generally marks [+animate] direct objects with the particle *a* independently of the definiteness of the object, as already shown in (1), repeated here as (24):

(24a)   [+animate], [±definite], [+specific]:
          Vi   *a* **la / unamujer**.   (Standard Spanish)
          see.past-1.sg   the a   woman

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[4] Note that the verbal mood does not always function as indicator of the specificity contrast between relativized nouns in Spanish. In some cases, the indicative does not prevent the [–specific] interpretation of the relativized noun. This may happen in cases, like those in (i), where the whole utterance has a generic character (Leonetti, 1999: 865; Pérez Saldanya, 1999: 3257):

(ia)   [+animate], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
          Quien calla   otorg*a*.
          who   is silent agrees-IND

(ib)   [+animate], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
          Óscar no   se   atrevería   a   dirigirse   a **una chica** que no habl*a*   español.
          Oscar not REF venture-COND to address-REF to a   girl   who not speaks-IND Spanish

In other cases the mood can change independently of the specificity of the relativized noun, as it can be observed in comparative constructions like those in (ii), where the NP is used predicatively and therefore is neutral with respect to [±specific]:

(ii)   [+animate], [–definite], [±*specific*]:
          Se   comporta como **una persona** que { ocult*a*   / ocult*e*   } algo.
          REFL behaves   like   a   person   who hides-IND   hides-SUB   something
          '(S)he conducts behaves like a person who hides something.'

(24b)   [+animate], [±definite], [+specific]:
         Vi   (*a) **la / una mujer**.   (Standard Spanish)
         see.past-1.sg   the a   woman
         'I saw the / a woman.'

The direct object with this particle is traditionally called 'prepositional accusative' in order to distinguish it from the *in*direct ("dative") object, which is always preceded by the preposition *a*. Some varieties of Spanish, especially American Spanish, allow the particle *a* to precede [–animate] direct objects, at least in certain contexts, as in (2), repeated as (25):[5]

(25a)   [–animate], [+definite], [+specific]:
         Vio   *a* **las sierras**.   (Puerto Rican Spanish)
         saw.past-3.sg   the mountains
         '(S)he saw the mountains'
(25b)   [–animate], [+definite], [+specific]:
         Cosecharon   *a***l maíz**.   (Argentinian Spanish)
         harvest.past-3.pl   the corn
         'They harvested the corn'

On the other hand, it can be observed that objects which are lexically characterized as [+animate] are used *without* the particle *a*. This is the case in examples like (26), provided by Brugè & Brugger (1996: 6):

(26a)   ... una fuente de vidanueva que purificaba **el hombre moral**
             a   source of life new   that purifies   the man   moral
         '... a source of new life which purifies the moral man'
(26b)   ?Las enfermedades y   la   guerra han exterminado **el hombre**
             the illnesses   and the war   have exterminated the man

The absence of *a* in these examples seems to be due to the fact that the direct object does not denote an individual person. It rather receives a "kind interpretation", which can be, according to Brugè & Brugger (1996), associated with the feature [–animate]. What strongly supports this analysis is the observation that, if one asks for the object in a *wh*-question, one can use, besides *a quién* 'who', the *wh*-word *qué* 'what' (Brugè & Brugger, 1996: 7):

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[5] Note that in Standard Spanish some verbs require the particle *a* with direct objects, independently of the feature [±animate]. This often happens with verbs which normally have [+animate] direct objects, as for example *llamar* 'to call' or *matar* 'to kill', and then lexicalize the particle (Real Academia Española, 1973: 373; Bruyne, 2002: 309, fn.5):
    (i)   [–animate], [+definite], [+specific]:
             Llamar a **la   muerte**.
             to-call   the death
    (ii)   [–animate], [+definite], [+specific]:
             Los griegos *mataron*   entonces *a* **la   poesía**
             the greeks kill.past-3.pl then   the poetry

(27a)   –¿**Qué** purifica unfuente de vidanueva?
                what purifies a source of life new
        'What does a source of new life purify?'
        –El   hombre moral
          the man   moral
(27b)   –¿**Qué** han exterminado las enfermedades y   la   guerra?
                 what have exterminated the illnesses   and the war
          'What did the illnesses and the war exterminate? '
        –El   hombre
          the man

As shown in (6) in section 2.1, the lexical choice of the *wh*-word in (27) indicates that a [–animate] object rather that a [+animate] one is intended in the answer. This lexical choice suggests that the object NPs in (26) to which the *wh*-words in (27) are referring may be interpreted as [–animate].

    The choice of *a* with direct objects is not only determined by animacy, but also by specificity. This can be observed in clauses where a [+animate] object is relativized, and where specificity is reflected in the choice of mood for the predicate in the relative clause (see last section). In these cases, the particle *a* must precede [+specific] direct objects, but it is normally omitted when the object is [–specific] (Jaeggli, 1982: 56, fn.14; Brugè & Brugger, 1996: 31; Leonetti, this volume):

(28a)   [+animate], [+definite], [+*specific*]:
        Busco   ***a* una cocinera que sabe   hablar   inglés**.
        search-1.sg   a   cook   who knows-IND to-speak English
(28b)   [+animate], [±definite], [–*specific*]:
        Busco   **una cocinera que sepa   hablar   inglés**.
        search-1.sg a   cook   who knows-SUB to-speak English
        'I am looking for a cook who can speak English'

What is important for our purpose is the observation, made by Leonetti (1999: 867), according to which *every* direct object used *without a* receives a weak or a non-specific interpretation. Thus, in existential constructions, which clearly favour a non-specific interpretation, the use of the marker *a* is not allowed. This is illustrated in (30) (see also Leonetti, this volume):

(29)   [+animate], [±definite], [–*specific*]:
        Había   (**a*) **unas / todas las mujeres en la   plaza**.
        (there) was   some / all   the women   in   the place

The same observation can be made in constructions with multiple quantification. As illustrated in (30a), the lack of *a* implicates that the direct object has a narrow scope. It has narrower scope than the universally quantified subject *todos los encuestados* and receives a non-specific interpretation, represented in (30b) (Brugè & Brugger, 1996: 34f; Leonetti, 1999: 867):

(30a)   [+animate], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
          Todos los encuestados   vieron **unapersona sospechosa**.
          all   the interrogated persons   saw   a   person   suspicious
(30b)   x [interrogated persons (x)]   y [person(y) & saw (x,y)]]

To sum up, the use of *a* with direct objects is determined by two referential parameters, animacy and specificity, while the third referential parameter (definiteness) does not interact here. Only a [+animate] and [+specific] direct object is preceded by *a*, as summarized in table (31):

(31)   The use of *a* with direct objects: Animacy and Specificity

	[+specific]	[–specific]
[+animate]	*a*	–
[–animate]	–	–

We are aware that this table does not capture all conditions for the use of *a*. There are several additional factors which determine its use, most of them are extensively discussed by Leonetti (this volume). He notes, for instance, that in certain contexts [+animate] and [–specific] direct objects are introduced by *a*, an option which should be excluded according to table (31). According to Leonetti (1999: 866, this volume), in most of these cases the presence of *a* can be explained by the fact that the category animacy predominates the category specificity and that therefore the [+animate] feature may override the [±specific] feature:[6]

   (32a)   [+*animate*], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
           Está   buscando *a* **alguien**
           is-3.sg   looking   someone
           '(S)he is looking for someone.'
   (32b)   [+*animate*], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
           Sería   estupendo si contrataron   *a* **un ayudante**
           would wonderful if contract-3.pl   an   assistant
           'It would be wonderful if they have contracted an assistant.'

Another interfering factor is the relation between the different grammatical functions *subject, indirect object* and *direct object.* It seems that the marking of [+animate] and [+specific] can depend on the values of these features in the noun phrases filling the other grammatical

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[6] As already noted in the preceding footnote, selection properties of the verb may determine the use of *a.* This is also the case when the object is [+animate] and [–specific] (Brugè & Brugger 1996, 45, Leonetti, this volume):
   (ia)   [+*animate*], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
           Pepa quiere matar *a* **unpolicía   qualquiera**
           Pepa wants to-kill   a   policeman any
           'Pepa wants to kill any policeman.'
   (ia)   [+*animate*], [–definite], [–*specific*]:
           Todas las niñas   admiraban   *a* **algúncantante**
           All   thechildren admire.past-3.pl   some singer
           'Every child admired some singer'

functions. The contrast between (33a) and (33b) lies in the animacy of the subject. In (33b) the subject is [-animate], while the object is marked with [+animate]. This violates the principle that the subject must not be lower on the animacy scale than the direct object.[7]

(33a)   [+*animate*], [±definite], [±specific]:
         La diva conoce *a* muchos aficionadosa la ópera.
         the diva knows   many   amateurs   of the opera
(33b)   [–*animate*], [±definite], [±specific]:
         ***La ópera** conoce *a* muchos aficionados.
          the opera knows   many   amateurs
(33c)   [–*animate*], [±definite], [±specific]:
         La ópera conoce muchos aficionados.
         the opera knows   many   amateurs

A similar observation can be made with respect to indirect objects. The omission of the particle *a* before the direct object is strongly preferred in double object constructions, even when the direct object bears the features [+animate] and [+specific]. According to the grammar of the Real Academia Española (1973: 374f), this happens in order to avoid ambiguity effects which emerge from the fact that the indirect object in Spanish is obligatorily marked by the preposition *a*:

(34)   [+*animate*], [±definite], [+*specific*]:
(34a)   ?Recomiende usted *a* **mi sobrino** al señor director
(34b)   Recomiende usted **mi sobrino** al señor director
         'Recommend my nephew to the director'

3.3 Clitic doubling

Clitic doubling is another domain in Spanish where the referential categories which we are discussing play a crucial role. Note that there is a crucial difference between clitic doubling with indirect objects and with direct objects. In the former case, clitic doubling is obligatory with pronouns and strongly preferred with proper nouns and [+definite] NPs in *all* varieties of Spanish (Jaeggli, 1982: 12; Suñer, 1988; Parodi, 1998; Fernández Soriano, 1999; Colantoni, 2002: 321):

(35a)   *Le*   doy   la carta **a él**   (Standard Spanish)
         Cl-DAT give-1sg theletter   to him
(35b)   *Le*   doy   la carta **a Juan**   (Standard Spanish)
         Cl-DAT give-1sg theletter   to Juan
(35c)   *Le*   doy   la carta **al   vecino**   (Standard Spanish)
         Cl-DAT give-1sg theletter   to-the neighbour

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[7] An alternative explanation is that the [–animate] subject does not license a [+specific] direct object. This explanation is in line with the theory of specificy presented in section 2.3. According to this theory, specific NPs must be anchored to some [+animate] expressions.

With [–definite] indirect objects, clitic doubling is not obligatory, but it is the strongly preferred option (Parodi, 1998: 87):

    (36d)   *Le*   doy   la   carta   **a un vecino**   (Standard Spanish)
            Cl-DAT give-1sg the letter to a   neighbour

Clitic doubling with direct objects primarily depends on the category definiteness. However, it is not the simple contrast between [+definite] and [–definite] which determines the use of clitics in constructions with direct objects. Rather, the clitic doubling phenomena can be explained on the basis of Aissen's Definiteness Scale in (7), repeated here as (37):

    (37)   Definiteness Scale (Aissen, 2000)
           personal pronoun > proper noun > definite NP > indefinite NP

Given this scale, we can observe that in Standard Spanish clitic doubling with direct objects is only possible with the leftmost elements, namely with personal pronouns. In this case, clitic doubling is obligatory (Jaeggli, 1982: 14; Parodi, 1998: 86; Fernández Soriano, 1999: 1248):

    (38a)   *La*   veo   **a ella**   (Standard Spanish)
            Cl-ACC see-1.sg   her
    (38b)   *Veo   **a ella**   (Standard Spanish)
             see-1.sg   her
            'I see her'

With full NPs, on the other hand, clitic doubling is generally excluded in Standard Spanish (Parodi, 1998: 89; Fernández Soriano, 1999: 1249):

    (39a)   ??*La*   veo   **a María**   (Standard Spanish)
             Cl-ACC see-1.sg   Maria
            'I saw María'
    (39b)   *_La_   veo   **a la mujer**   (Standard Spanish)
             Cl-ACC see-1.sg   the woman
            'I saw the woman'
    (39c)   *_La_   veo   **a una mujer**   (Standard Spanish)
             Cl-ACC see-1.sg   a   woman
            'I see a woman'

Interestingly, however, some dialects of Spanish, especially Río de Plata Spanish, allow clitic doubling when the direct object is a *full* NP. In these dialects clitic doubling is possible with proper nouns and with [+definite] NPs, as shown in (40a) and (40b). Clitic doubling with [–definite] direct object NPs, however, seems to be excluded, as illustrated in (30c) (Jaeggli, 1982: 19; Parodi, 1998; Fernández Soriano, 1999: 1251):

(40a)   *La*   veo   **a María**   (Río de la Plata Spanish)
        Cl-ACC see-1.sg   Maria
        'I see María'

(40b)   *La*   veo   **a la mujer**   (Río de la Plata Spanish)
        Cl-ACC see-1.sg   the woman
        'I see the woman'

(40c)   **La*   veo   **a una mujer**   (Río de la Plata Spanish)
         Cl-ACC see-1.sg   a   woman
        'I see a woman'

Clitic doubling is determined by definiteness and grammatical role, as summarized in table (41). Río de La Plata Spanish differs from Standard Spanish in that it allows clitic doubling even for elements that are low on the Definiteness Scale. While this difference is not so obvious for indirect objects (the only difference is the optional clitic doubling for indefinite NPs in Standard Spanish), it is very explicit for direct objects. Río de La Plata Spanish allows clitic doubling with all but indefinite NPs, while Standard Spanish only allows it with personal pronouns.

(41)   Clitic doubling in Spanish: Grammatical Function and the Definiteness Scale

		personal pronoun	proper noun	definite NP	indefinite NP
indirect	Río de la Plata Spanish	+	+	+	+
object	Standard Spanish	+	+	+	(+)
direct	Río de la Plata Spanish	+	+	+	–
object	Standard Spanish	+	(+)	–	–

3.4 Clitic doubling and the "prepositional accusative"

Clitic doubling and the particle *a* very often co-occur: With indirect objects they almost always come together, and in many cases they also appear together with direct objects. Therefore, in accordance with Kayne (1975) and Jaeggli (1982; 1986) it has been assumed that clitic doubling is licensed by the particle *a*, rather than attributed to the Definiteness Scale (see Kaiser, 1992 for a detailed discussion of this approach, often called 'Kayne's generalization'). He argues that in Río de la Plata Spanish *a* functions as a *dummy* case marker which is able to assign (abstract) case to the object NP, while the object clitic receives or "absorbs" the case directly from the verb. This assumption seems to be supported by the observation that in Río de Plata Spanish, as in many other dialects of American Spanish (cf. (2)), [–animate] direct objects may appear in combination with *a,* and that in this case clitic doubling is possible or even the strongly preferred option (Laca, 1987: 307; Suñer, 1988: 399; Fernández Soriano, 1999: 1251):

(42a)   [–*animate*], [+definite], [+specific]:
        Lo   vamos   a   empujar **a**l   **ómnibus**   (Río de La Plata Spanish)
        Cl-ACC will.3.pl.   push   the bus
        'We will push the bus.'

(42b)   ¿Tú *la*   friegas ***a* la cocina**?   (Río de La Plata Spanish)
        you Cl-ACC wipe   the kitchen
        'Do you wipe the kitchen?':

However, this close connection between clitic doubling and the particle *a* would be surprising since we have seen that the use of the particle depends on specificity and animacy, while clitic doubling is determined by definiteness. We would therefore predict cases in which we find clitic doubling but not the particle *a* and vice versa. This prediction is born out by observations by Suñer (1988). She argues that *a* cannot function as a dummy case marker in Río de la Plata Spanish, since Río de la Plata Spanish also allows clitic doubling with [–animate] direct objects which are not preceded by the particle *a* (Suñer, 1988: 399):

(43a)   [–*animate*], [+definite], [+ specific]:
        Yo *la* tenía prevista   **esta muerte**.
        I   her have   previewed this   death
(43b)   [–*animate*], [+definite], [+ specific]:
        Yo *lo*   voy a comprar **el diario**   antes   de subir.
        I   him   will buy   the newspaper before to go upstairs

Given these examples and given the definiteness scale in (7)/(37), it seems that this scale is able to describe correctly the possibility of clitic doubling in Río de la Plata Spanish. In other words, definiteness – and *not* the presence or absence of *a* – is the relevant factor for clitic doubling in this dialect. The examples in (43) – and there are many more like these (see Parodi, 1998: 89) – show that clitic doubling and the use of the particle *a* with the direct object follow independent parameters: Clitic doubling is conditioned by one referential parameter, namely definiteness, while the use of the particle *a* is determined by two parameters: animacy and specificity.

3.5 Clitic doubling and more referential parameters

This is not the end of the story. Clitic doubling in Río de la Plata Spanish is conditioned by additional referential parameters. Recall that according to the literature it is claimed that clitic doubling is excluded with [–definite] direct objects in Río de la Plata Spanish (cf. (39c)). Suñer (1988) notes that under certain circumstances clitic doubling is possible with [–definite] direct objects in Río de la Plata Spanish. But, according to Suñer (1988: 396), this is only possible when the [–definite] object NP is [+specific] (cf. also Parodi, 1998: 88f):

(44a)   [+animate], [–*definite*], [+*specific*]:
        Diariamente, *la*   escuchaba a **una mujer que cantaba   tangos**.
        daily   Cl-ACC listen-3.sg   a   woman who sing-past-3.sg tangos
(44b)   [+animate], [–*definite*], [–*specific*]:
        La*   busco   **una mujer que sepa   inglés.
         Cl-ACC   search-1.sg a   woman who knows-SUB English

Given this observation, Suñer (1988: 397) argues that the "pertinent feature for doubling is [+specific] and not [+definite]". According to that, we have to modify our table (41) and replace [definite NP] and [indefinite NP] by [specific NP] and [non-specific NP] respectively, as in (45):

(45)   Clitic doubling in Spanish: Definiteness Scale and Specificity

		personal pronoun	proper noun	**specific NP**	**non-specific NP**
direct	Río de la Plata Spanish	+	+	+	–
object	Standard Spanish	+	(+)	–	–

With such a table, we could argue that clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish only depends on the referential parameter [±specific], assuming that personal pronouns and proper nouns are always [+specific]. If this were correct, we would still have to explain how such a change from [±definite] to [±specific] is possible and how we can integrate the Specificity Contrast into the Definiteness Scale.

    This shift from [±definite] to [±specific] is also suggested by the analysis of further data from Río de La Plata Spanish. We start with the simplified categorization in (46), where clitic doubling only depends on [±specific].

(46)   Clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish: Specificity

[+specific]	[–specific]
+	–

Suñer (1988) argues that clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish is only possible if the direct object is [+specific] and [+animate], while it is excluded with [+specific] [–animate] direct objects. This is shown by Suñer's (1988: 396) example in (47). Thus we can summarize Suñer's assumption in table (48):

(47)   [–*animate*], [+specific]:
         *La   compramos   (a) **esa novela**.
          CL   buy.past-1.pl   that novel
         'We bought that novel'

(48)   Clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish: Specificity and Animacy (Suñer, 1988)

	[+specific]	[–specific]
[+animate]	+	–
[–animate]	– (cf. (47))	–

(Suñer, 1988)

Parodi (1998), on the other hand, argues that clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish is only possible if the direct object is [+specific] and [+definite]. Her examples include (49), which she categorizes as [–definite] and [+specific]. Her view can be summarized by table (50):

(49)   [–*definite*], [+specific]:
         *La   veo   a   **una mujer**.
          ACC-CL   see-1.sg   a   woman
         'I see a woman.'

(50)   Clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish: Specificity and Definiteness

	[+specific]	[–specific]
[+definite]	+	–
[–definite]	– (cf. (49))	–

(Parodi, 1998)

The two authors agree that there are two interacting referential categories, one of which is specificity. However, they disagree about the other category. If we combine the two tables (48) and (50) into one table (51), the disagreement concerns only two cells, [+animate], [–definite], [+specific] and [–animate], [+definite], [+specific]:

(51)   Clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish: Specificity, Definiteness, and Animacy

[+specific]	[+definite]	[–definite]
[+animate]	+ / +	+ (cf. (44a)) / – (cf. (49))
[–animate]	– (cf. 47) / + (cf. (52))	– / –

(Suñer, 1988 / Parodi, 1998)

Both authors give examples that confirm their view. Suñer shows (example (44a)) that [–definite] [+specific] objects are doubled if they are [+animate]. Parodi's example (49) seems to contradict this example, since it seems to show that clitic doubling with [+animate] objects is ungrammatical when they are [–definite] [+specific]. However, the object in (49) may be understood as [–specific] if there is no additional context. The context in (44a) makes the specific reading very prominent. Parodi, on the other hand, quotes (52) which shows that a [–animate] [+specific] object can be doubled if it is [+definite]. Again, this contradicts Suñer's example (47), where the demonstrative object is not doubled.

(52)   [–animate], [+definite] [+specific] (Parodi, 1998: 89)
         La   compro   **la mesa**
         ACC-CL   buy-1.sg the table
         'I buy the table'

We think that it must have become obvious from the discussion that there is no very clear picture of the conditions for clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish, and that further research is necessary. The ambiguous situation may also indicate that we observe a process that is developing. However, if we try to fix the picture and describe a synchronic system, we feel forced to assume that clitic doubling depends on all three referential categories, as summarized in table (53). Even if we do not consider the two controversial cells, we still find a contrast between [+animate] and [+definite] vs. [–animate] and [–definite] for [+specific] objects.

(53)   Clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish: Specificity, Definiteness, and Animacy

[+specific]	[+definite]	[–definite]
[+animate]	+	(+)
[–animate]	(+)	–

[–specific]	[+definite]	[–definite]
[+animate]	–	–
[–animate]	–	–

4. Combining referential parameters

Referential parameters, such as animacy, definiteness, and specificity, determine different morphosyntactic contrasts in Spanish (as well as in other languages). We have seen in the last sections, that they do this in different combinations (or "conspiracies"). The mood in relative clauses is primarily determined by specificity. The use of the particle *a* preceding direct objects is controlled by specificity and animacy. In section 3.5, we argued that clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish depends on all three referential categories. In the course of our presentation, we have presented different scales, tables and charts combining different parameters. In this section, we present some very preliminary ideas about possible ways of combining two or more referential categories. There are different ways in which the interaction of the three referential parameters are described: (i) as subordination of one parameter under another; (ii) as cross-classification of two or more parameters; and (iii) as harmonic alignment between a two-part scale and a multi-part scale.

4.1 Subordination

Specificity is often understood as secondary referential property of NPs that applies only to indefinite NPs and it is often included into Aissen's Definiteness Scale (7)/(37), such as in Aissen (2000: 2):

(54)   Definiteness Scale (Aissen 2000: 2)
         personal pronoun > proper noun > definite NP > specific indefinite NP
         > non specific indefinite NP

According to this view, definite NPs are used if both the speaker and hearer can identify the referent, specific indefinite NPs if only the speaker can identify the referent, while non-specific indefinite NPs indicate that none of them can identify the referent:

(55)   The "identifiability" criteria for definiteness and specificity

identified by	definite (+ specific)	indefinite specific	indefinite non-specific
speaker	+	+	–
hearer	+	–	–

However, this view is incorrect for theoretical as well as empirical reasons. The functional "explanation" or motivation for subordinating specificity under definiteness cannot be correct since the discussion of the last three decades has convincingly shown that definiteness cannot be explained in terms of "identifiability". Definiteness is explained in terms of uniqueness,

anaphoric linkage and familiarity, functional concepts, or situational salience (see section 2.2). The empirical problems with such a table will be discussed in the next section.

There might be other cases, where subordination of one parameter under another is appropriate. For instance, if we assume a contrast of "ways of reference" as in (56) and the contrast between specific and non-specific as in (57), then we can combine the two contrasts such that the latter contrast only holds for the feature [+individuated] of the first contrast, as illustrated in the tree (58):

(56) Ways of reference
      individuated vs. generic vs. predicative
(57) Specificity
      specific - non-specific
(58) Subordinating specificity under ways of reference

4.2 Cross classification

Many studies on grammatical contrasts that are triggered by referential parameters assume the subordination of specificity under indefinite full NPs. However, some studies that investigate the phenomena in more detail give good evidence that definiteness and specificity form, rather, a cross-classification as in (59), where the bold cell is the crucial one: [+definite], but [–specific]. The discussion in section 3.1 has shown that mood selection in relative clauses depends on specificity. A model like (54) or (55) would predict that all definite NPs are specific and therefore trigger indicative mood in relative clauses. However, evidence from Spanish, as in (60 a+b), shows that there are non-specific definite NPs, which therefore can trigger subjunctive mood.

(59) Cross-classification of definiteness and specificity

	[+definite]	[-definite]
[+specific]	*la mujer que sabe inglés*	*una mujer que sabe inglés*
[-specific]	*la mujer que sepa inglés*	*una mujer que sepa inglés*

(60a)   [+animate], [+definite], [-*specific*]:
         Busco   (*a*) **la mujer que *sepa*   inglés**.
         search-1.sg.   the woman who knows-SUBJ English
         'I look for the woman who knows / will know English.'
(60b)   [+animate], [+definite], [+*specific*]:
         Busco   *a* **la mujer que *sabe*   inglés**.
         search-1.sg.   the woman who knows-IND English
         'I look for the woman who knows English.'

The discussion of clitic doubling in Río de La Plata Spanish suggests that we even have three parameters that cross-classify. Parodi (1998, 91) therefore proposes to extend Aissen's Definiteness Scale (54) by the two additional parameters specificity and animacy, which results in the following scale (61).

(61)   Integrated Definiteness Scale (including animacy and specificity)

1.+2. pron.>	3.pron. >	full NP / animate > full NP / definite > full NP / specific >	full NP / inanimate full NP / indefinite full NP / non-specific

Lazard (1984, 283) proposes a very similar combined scale of definiteness and humanness (= animacy) for "actance variation" (i.e. differential object marking, or DOM) in various languages.

(62)   Combined scale of definiteness and humanness

1	2	3	4	5	6
1.+2. pron.	3. pron Proper Names	Definite Human	Indefinite Non-human	Mass	Generic

It is still unclear what it means to have a scale with parallel contrasts in certain cells, as in (61) and (62). In these cases we have only a partial order and would need additional context to decide a global order.

4.3 Harmonic Alignment

Often different scales align in such a way that their higher values and their lower values more easily combine than a high value with a low value etc. This can be illustrated by the alignment of the Relational Scale (63) and the Animacy Scale (64) (see Aissen, 2000: 6):

(63)   Relational Scale: Subject > Object
(64)   Animacy Scale: Human > Animate > Inanimate

It is not possible to combine the two scales into one, but harmonic alignment (borrowed from Optimality Theory – see details in Aissen, 2000) allows us to modify each of the two parts in the

two-part scale in (63) by each of the values of the multi-part scale (64). Thus, harmonic alignment of grammatical function with animacy forms two scales, one on subjects and one on objects. Each expresses the relative markedness of possible associations with the various degrees of animacy.

(65a)   Subject/Human > Subject/Animate > Subject/Inanimate
(65b)   Object/Inanimate > Object/Animate > Object/Human

The scale on subjects (65a) expresses that human subjects are less marked than animate ones, which, in turn, are less marked than inanimate ones. The scale (65b) on objects shows the reverse, namely that inanimate object are less marked than animate objects, and so on. The latter scale (65b) describes one of the parameters of "differential object marking" (or DOM) in many languages (Bossong, 1985). Spanish realizes this DOM by the prepositional accusative (see section 3.2) and by clitic doubling (see sections 3.3-3.5).

It seems that harmonic alignment is appropriate if we combine a two-part scale with a many-part scale that have a similar orientation or markedness. However, if we have two many-part scales or two scales without an intrinsic orientation (such as specificity), we cannot rely on harmonic alignment. Furthermore, if we combine more than two scales, we have to include cross-classification, as in 4.2.

This very brief discussion of combining referential parameters has shown that we must carefully examine the parameters and the empirical facts in a language before we can apply one of the discussed compositional rules.

5. Summary and direction for further research

In this article, we have described different morphosyntactic phenomena in Spanish in terms of the interaction of the referential categories animacy, definiteness, and specificity. Each of these categories refers to a different cognitive-semantic level: Animacy is a lexical or cognitive feature of NPs, definiteness is a discourse-pragmatic property of the discourse item representing the NP, and specificity expresses a semantic property that determines the referent in a particular way. Even though these three categories are associated with quite different semantic domains, their grammatical reflexes are closely interrelated, as can be shown for the mood in relative clauses, the prepositional accusative, and clitic doubling in Spanish. Our analysis has not only provided a uniform description in terms of the interaction of the discussed referential categories, it has also demonstrated data that allows us to evaluate different theoretical models of combining animacy, definiteness, and specificity. Still, further research is necessary in all three areas: We need more detailed investigations of relevant morphosyntactic contrasts, better theoretical models of underlying referential categories, and more discussion about the interaction of referential categories.

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